Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Commonly Used Queries and Examples

Hello IT Pros,

I have collected the Microsoft for Endpoint (Microsoft  ATP) advanced hunting queries from my demo, Microsoft Demo and Github for your convenient reference. As we knew, you or your InfoSec Team may need to run a few queries in your daily security monitoring task.

To save the query

  • In Securitycenter.windows.com,
  • go to Advanced hunting and create the query,
  • copy and paste the content,
  • save them for future re-use

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Query Name Content Note
Search Device Events by IP address DeviceNetworkEvents

| where RemoteIP == “52.176.49.76”

List Devices with Schedule Task created by Virus DeviceProcessEvents

| where FolderPath endswith “schtasks.exe” and ProcessCommandLine has ” /create ” and AccountName != “system”

List Device contained Virus File Name DeviceFileEvents

| where  FileName == ‘Invoice.pdf.exe'

List Devices with Phising File extension (double extension) as .pdf.exe, .docx.exe, .doc.exe, .mp3.exe DeviceProcessEvents

| where Timestamp > ago(7d)

| where FileName endswith “.pdf.exe”

or FileName endswith “.doc.exe”

or FileName contains “.docx.exe”

or FileName contains “.mp3.exe”

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, AccountSid, AccountName, AccountDomain;

| top 100 by Timestamp

List Device blocked by Windows ExploitGuard DeviceEvents

| where  ActionType  =~ “ExploitGuardNetworkProtectionBlocked”

| summarize count(RemoteUrl) by InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl,Audit_Only=tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).IsAudit);

| sort by count_RemoteUrl desc

List All Files Create during the last hour DeviceFileEvents

| where Timestamp > ago(1h)

| project FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, DeviceName, Timestamp

| limit 1000

List Device who has a specific File Hash DeviceFileEvents

| where SHA1 == “4aa9deb33c936c0087fb05e312ca1f09369acd27”

List IP address blocked by FW rule DeviceEvents

| where ActionType in (“FirewallOutboundConnectionBlocked”, “FirewallInboundConnectionBlocked”, “FirewallInboundConnectionToAppBlocked”)

| project DeviceId , Timestamp , InitiatingProcessFileName , InitiatingProcessParentFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort

| summarize MachineCount=dcount(DeviceId) by RemoteIP

| top 100 by MachineCount desc

Look for public the IP addresses of devices that failed to logon multiple times, using multiple accounts, and eventually succeeded. DeviceLogonEvents

| where isnotempty(RemoteIP)

and AccountName !endswith “$”

and RemoteIPType == “Public”

| extend Account=strcat(AccountDomain, “”, AccountName)

| summarize

Successful=countif(ActionType == “LogonSuccess”),

Failed = countif(ActionType == “LogonFailed”),

FailedAccountsCount = dcountif(Account, ActionType == “LogonFailed”),

SuccessfulAccountsCount = dcountif(Account, ActionType == “LogonSuccess”),

FailedAccounts = makeset(iff(ActionType == “LogonFailed”, Account, “”), 5),

SuccessfulAccounts = makeset(iff(ActionType == “LogonSuccess”, Account, “”), 5)

by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteIPType

| where Failed > 10 and Successful > 0 and FailedAccountsCount > 2 and SuccessfulAccountsCount == 1

From WD ATP

Demo

Look for machines failing to log-on to multiple machines or using multiple accounts // Note – RemoteDeviceName is not available in all remote logon attempts

DeviceLogonEvents

| where isnotempty(RemoteDeviceName)

| extend Account=strcat(AccountDomain, “”, AccountName)

| summarize

Successful=countif(ActionType == “LogonSuccess”),

Failed = countif(ActionType == “LogonFailed”),

FailedAccountsCount = dcountif(Account, ActionType == “LogonFailed”),

SuccessfulAccountsCount = dcountif(Account, ActionType == “LogonSuccess”),

FailedComputerCount = dcountif(DeviceName, ActionType == “LogonFailed”),

SuccessfulComputerCount = dcountif(DeviceName, ActionType == “LogonSuccess”)

by RemoteDeviceName

| where

Successful > 0 and

((FailedComputerCount > 100 and FailedComputerCount > SuccessfulComputerCount) or

(FailedAccountsCount > 100 and FailedAccountsCount > SuccessfulAccountsCount))

From WD ATP

Demo

List all devices named start with prefix FC- DeviceInfo

| where  DeviceName startswith “FC-“

List Windows Defender Scan Actions completed or Cancelled DeviceEvents

| where ActionType in (“AntivirusScanCompleted”, “AntivirusScanCancelled”)

| extend A=parse_json(AdditionalFields)

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType,ScanType = A.ScanTypeIndex, StartedBy= A.User

| sort by Timestamp desc

List Devices access to bad URL DeviceNetworkEvents

| where RemoteUrl == “www.advertising.com”

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

List All URL access by a Device named contained the word FC-DC DeviceNetworkEvents

| where RemoteUrl != “www.advertising.com” and DeviceName contains “fc-dc”

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Github Advanced Hunting Cheat Sheet: 

Purpose Query Content Notes
Find endpoints communicating to a specific domain.

Author: @maarten_goet

let Domain = “http://domainxxx.com”; DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) and RemoteUrl contains Domain | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemotePort, RemoteUrl | top 100 by Timestamp desc “let” is the command to introduce variables.

Variable name: “Domain”

with value: “http://domainxxx.com

Finds PowerShell execution events that could involve a download.

Author: @MicrosoftMTP

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName in~ (“powershell.exe”, “powershell_ise.exe”) | where ProcessCommandLine has_any(“WebClient”, “DownloadFile”, “DownloadData”, “DownloadString”, “WebRequest”, “Shellcode”, “http”, “https”) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, RemoteIPType | top 100 by Timestamp “union” is the command to combine multiple Device Query Tables
Find scheduled tasks created by a non-system account

Author: @maarten_goet

DeviceProcessEvents

| where FolderPath endswith “schtasks.exe” and ProcessCommandLine has “/create” and AccountName != “system”

| where Timestamp > ago(7d)

Find possible clear text passwords in Windows registry.

Author: @MicrosoftMTP

DeviceRegistryEvents

| where ActionType == “RegistryValueSet”

| where RegistryValueName == “DefaultPassword”

| where RegistryKey has @”SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon”

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey | top 100 by Timestamp

Lookup process executed from binary hidden in Base64 encoded file.

Author: @MicrosoftMTP

DeviceProcessEvents

| where Timestamp > ago(14d)

| where ProcessCommandLine contains “.decode(‘base64')” or ProcessCommandLine contains “base64 –decode” or ProcessCommandLine contains “.decode64(”

| project Timestamp , DeviceName , FileName , FolderPath , ProcessCommandLine , InitiatingProcessCommandLine

| top 100 by Timestamp

Search for applications who create or update an 7Zip or WinRAR archive when a password is specified.

Author: @PowershellPoet

DeviceProcessEvents | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @”s[aukfAUKF]s.*s-p”

| extend SplitLaunchString = split(ProcessCommandLine, ‘ ‘)

| where array_length(SplitLaunchString) >= 5 and SplitLaunchString[1] in~ (‘a','u','k','f')

| mv-expand SplitLaunchString

| where SplitLaunchString startswith “-p”

| extend ArchivePassword = substring(SplitLaunchString, 2, strlen(SplitLaunchString))

| project-reorder ProcessCommandLine, ArchivePassword

-p is the password switch and is immediately followed by a password without a space

Reference: 

Disclaimer

The sample are not supported under any Microsoft standard support program or service. The sample are provided AS IS without warranty of any kind. Microsoft further disclaims all implied warranties including, without limitation, any implied warranties of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose. The entire risk arising out of the use or performance of the sample and documentation remains with you. In no event shall Microsoft, its authors, or anyone else involved in the creation, production, or delivery of the scripts be liable for any damages whatsoever (including, without limitation, damages for loss of business profits, business interruption, loss of business information, or other pecuniary loss) arising out of the use of or inability to use the sample scripts or documentation, even if Microsoft has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

 

This article was originally published by Microsoft's Core Infrastructure and Security Blog. You can find the original article here.